Direct prompt injection
User input overrides system prompt, exfiltrates instructions, or coerces unsafe output.
AI security testing for LLM-backed features — prompt injection, data leakage, tool-use safety, and RAG pipeline risks, aligned to the OWASP LLM Top 10.
A crafted prompt can extract another tenant's data, bypass policy filters, or coerce your agent into calling an API it should not. These show up in production features that shipped without adversarial testing.
Standard web app and API pentests will not test prompt injection, RAG retrieval boundaries, or tool-use manipulation. This engagement does.
User input overrides system prompt, exfiltrates instructions, or coerces unsafe output.
A retrieved document, web page, or email instructs the model into unintended actions.
Cross-user, cross-tenant, or cross-conversation context leakage in chat and RAG.
Unsafe tool selection, parameter tampering, unbounded tool chains, privilege boundaries.
Generation of harmful content, evasion of policy filters, and rate-limit abuse.
Retrieval boundaries, source-poisoning resilience, content-isolation guarantees.
A chat or copilot on your product data. Risk: a curious user extracts another tenant's data or the system prompt.
A summarization or Q&A feature that reads uploaded or ingested documents. Risk: indirect prompt injection through retrieved content.
A feature where the model can call APIs, search, or modify data. Risk: unsafe tool selection or parameter manipulation.
The exact prompts, documents, and tool inputs we used. Reusable in your CI as regression tests.
Findings mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and to surrounding API / web categories.
For each class of finding, a paste-ready set of mitigations: prompt structure, tool gating, retrieval limits.
Shipping an LLM feature and not sure what to test?
A quick scoping call maps the risk surface and gives you a fixed scope and price.
Get a straight answerAPI testing →
The API layer that exposes the LLM feature to the world.
Web application testing →
The web app or chat UI the user actually sees.
Authenticated testing →
Role boundaries inside an LLM feature with multiple user types.
Compliance pentest →
Frame findings for SOC 2, ISO, NIST AI RMF, EU AI Act.
Before it reaches customers, and again whenever the prompt structure, tool-use surface, or data the model can read changes. Most regressions come from prompt-template edits or new tool integrations, not the model itself.
Direct injection (user instruction overrides the system prompt) and indirect injection (a document, page, or email instructs the model). We test both against the actual feature surface — chat, RAG, summarization, and agent tool use.
Yes — context data the user should not see, cross-tenant and cross-user content returns, and training-data extraction patterns.
Yes. RAG: source-document poisoning, retrieval boundary violations, instruction-injection through retrieved content. Tool-use: unsafe tool selection, parameter tampering, and chain-of-thought leakage.
Yes. Findings are mapped to the OWASP LLM Top 10 and to the OWASP API and Web Top 10 where the surrounding service is in scope.
A quick scoping call with the senior tester who would run your engagement. No slides, no pitch — we look at what you have, tell you what we would test first, and give you a fixed scope, price, and date.